Posts Tagged ‘Pasadena DUI Attorneys’

Lawsuit filed against Judge Bernie LaForteza by Dr. DUI

Wednesday, April 21st, 2010

Okorie OKOROCHA, Esq., SBN 226658

California Legal Team

117 E. Colorado Blvd., Suite 465

Pasadena, CA 91105

(626) 792-1301

Attorney for Plaintiff The Defendant

and Prospective Class Members

THE UNITED STATES DISRTICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

1.  Comes plaintiff The Defendant individually, and as class representative for those persons similarly situated as arrested and prosecuted for crimes under California law (“Defendant”), who files this civil rights complaint pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. §1983 for violation of the excessive bail clause of U.S.Const.Amend. VIII,   and for imposing a more severe penalty for exercising the right to a jury, a due process violation under U.S. Const.Amend. XIV and the right to a jury trial under U.S. Const.Amend. VI.

2.  Defendant sues Defendant Bernie Laforteza (“Laforteza”) in his individual capacity only for declaratory relief only. Laforteza is an agent of California, and is sued vicariously under the doctrines of respondeat superior and ratification for prospective injunctive relief only.  This declaratory relief action is cognizant under Title 42 U.S.C.  §1983 pursuant to Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005).

3.  This court has proper jurisdiction pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. §1367(a), and proper venue pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. §1391(a)(2); both as Laforteza was the presiding judge on Defendant’s case in its Superior Court In And For The County Of Los Angeles.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

4.  The instant case was a standard Driving Under the Influence case pursuant to Cal.Veh.Code §§ 23152 (a) and (b) (“DUI”). Defendant had no bad driving record, and was a completely cooperative suspect who was pulled over initially for not having a registration sticker.

5.  At the Antelope Valley/Lancaster Court, the standard punishment on a first time DUI offense for those who plead guilty is 3 days of County Jail.  The Defendant is given credit for time served and is not forced to go to jail but making up the days of jail by doing Community Labor through the California Transportation Department for up to three (3) days depending on credit.

6.  In the instant case, Defendant had used her inhaler which contains alcohol prior to administering the test.  Defendant testified that she did use the inhaler but that she could not recall exactly when she used the inhaler in relation to the breath tests that she took.  Defendant took both preliminary alcohol screening tests and had readings of 0.20 and 0.19 and evidentiary breath tests one hour later with readings of 0.13 and 0.12.  There were no blood tests.

7.  The Criminalist for California, Ed Barley (“Barley”) attempted to lie by stating that the inhaler could only increase Defendant’s blood alcohol reading by 0.01 based on a particular article.  Barley was later impeached with the same article he was lying based on and shown that the article indicated alcohol based inhalers cause an increase of 0.20 in the blood alcohol reading on breath machines.   Barley also could not explain the drastic difference in readings and testified that such a drop is only seen in alcohol detoxification.

8.  Prior to the trial, Defendant was offered a plea bargain of 3 days Caltrans labor, standard fines, alcohol and MADD classes  However, throughout the trial, Counsel for Defendant was consistently worried that the Laforteza would severely punish her for exercising her right to counsel and a trial as he was passively supportive of the Deputy District Attorney Donna Rappaport when she indicated that the People would seek the maximum if Defendant attempted to exercise her jury trial rights.   Counsel was so concerned that prior to the jury’s return, multiple briefs were filed on the subject of bail pending appeal and increased punishment for going to trial

9.  Defendant was convicted at a jury trial on March 18, 2010.  Despite Laforteza being informed of the law, he sentenced the Defendant to sixty (60) days in jail and gave no reason on the record.  When asked for bail, he set the “reasonable” bail at $150,000.  The bail schedule for the offense is $5,000 and Defendant was a young nursing student with close community ties.

10.  There is no doubt that the sentence was in retaliation for exercising the right to go to trial. Furthermore, counsel for Defendant filed these brief’s because the Antelope Valley/Lancaster Court consistently violates the U.S. and California Constitution in this manner and uses other unconstitutional methods such as remanding Defendants upon conviction and making them serve five (5) days before sentencing, the maximum allowed under the law, to make sure the Defendant gets jail time.

11.  Defendant sues as class representative for those similarly situation as persons arrested and prosecuted for crimes in Los Angeles County.  The actions brought by the case at bar are best resolved by class action status because they are so numerous or substantial that the maintenance of a class action would be advantageous to the judicial process and to the litigants.  Further, there are predominant common questions of law or fact between all plaintiff’s; Defendant as class representative has claims or defenses typical of the class; and class counsel will adequately s represent the entire class equally as no monetary damages are sought.  Thus, all of the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 are met for numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy of representation of the entire class.

CAUSES OF ACTION

1.

IMPOSING EXCESSIVE BAIL THAT SHOCKS THE CONSCIOUS

IN VIOLATION OF U.S.CONST.AMEND. VIII. EXCESSIVE BAIL CLAUSE (DECLARATORY RELIEF ONLY)

12.  Defendant realleges and incorporates all facts and allegations expressed in paragraphs no. 1-11, inclusive, as if alleged and incorporated herein.

13.  Defendant and others similarly situated have a constitution right under U.S.Const.Amend. VIII to not have an excessive bail amount imposed on her that shocks the conscious.

14.  The standard and customary bail schedule for the offense is $5,000. However, upon Defendant’s conviction on March 18, 2010, Laforteza imposed a bail of $150,000 for a first time DUI conviction for violating Cal.Veh.Code §§ 23152 (a) and (b), both misdemeanors. This imposition of excessive bail worthy of a violent felony was such that it shocks the conscious and in violation of U.S.Const.Amend. VIII.

15.  Laforteza has a policy, pattern and practice in his rulings and decisions made while a judge in the Los Angeles County Superior Court, criminal division, of imposing such excessive bail amount on those criminal defendants that come before them prosecuted in violation of U.S.Const.Amend. VIII.

16.  A declaration should issue establishing that Laforteza has and does impose  excessive fines upon all criminal defendants that come before him that shock the conscious in violation of U.S.Const.Amend. VIII.

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2.

IMPOSING A MORE SEVERE PENALTY IN SENTENCING UPON EXERCISING THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL

THAN WOULD BE RECEIVED UPON PLEADING GUILTY IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE UNDER U.S.CONST.AMEND. XIV AND THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL CLAUSE UNDER U.S.CONST.AMEND. VI.  (DECLARATORY RELIEF ONLY)

17.  Defendant realleges and incorporates all facts and allegations expressed in paragraphs no. 1-16, inclusive, as if alleged and incorporated herein.

18.  Defendant and others similarly situated have a constitution right under U.S.Const.Amend. XIV to the due process of law to not have a more severe punishment imposed upon them upon any conviction for exercising their constitutional right under U.S.Const.Amend VI to take their case to a jury trial, as opposed to pleading guilty and waiving the right to a jury trial.

19.  A plea offer was made by Laforteza before trial that was for of 3 days Caltrans labor, standard fines, alcohol and MADD classes.  No additional material facts were proffered at trial which would justify any increased penalty from the plea offer made to Defendant. However, upon Defendant’s conviction on March 18, 2010, Laforteza imposed a sentence of 60 days in jail, well above the plea bargain offered.

20.  Laforteza has a policy, pattern practice in his rulings and decisions made while a judge in the Los Angeles County Superior Court, criminal division, of imposing a more severe penalty upon defendants that come before them prosecuted, and who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial than upon those who plead guilty and waive the right to a jury trial, in violation of the due process clause of U.S.Const.Amend. XIV and the jury trial clause of U.S.Const.Amend. VI.

21.  A declaration should issue establishing that Laforteza has and does impose a more severe penalty upon those defendants who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial as opposed to leading guilty and waive their right to a jury trial in violation of the due process clause of U.S.Const.Amend. XIV and the jury trial clause of U.S.Const.Amend. VI.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

22.  Wherefore Defendant and all plaintiffs pray for such relief as follows:

a)  A declaration establishing that Laforteza has and does impose excessive bail amounts that shock the conscious upon any criminal defendants that come before them prosecuted for alleged crimes in violation of U.S.Const.Amend. VIII;

b)  A declaration establishing that Laforteza has and does impose a more severe penalty upon those defendants coming before them and prosecuted for alleged crimes who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial that they were offered to plead guilty and waive the right to a jury trial.

c)  For attorney’s fees pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. §1988.

d)  For all costs of suit.

` e)  For all other such relief as the court deems proper and justified.

Dated this___day of March, 2010 CALIFORIA LEGAL TEAM

________________________

Okorie Okorocha

Attorney for Plaintiff The Defendant and                the Prospective Class Members

Crowe & Dunlevy, PC v. Stidham, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1211 – Dist. Court, ND Oklahoma

Thursday, April 1st, 2010

With regard to the textual discussion of judicial immunity, the sentence immediately preceding footnote 6 indicates that plaintiffs are generally able to sue judicial officers for declaratory relief. Id. at 766 (noting “[t]he only type of relief available to a plaintiff who sues a judge is declaratory relief“). This sentence continues to state that “not every plaintiff is entitled to this remedy,” and footnote 6, which is placed at the end of this sentence, provides additional explanation regarding the identity of those plaintiffs who are not “entitled to this remedy.” The Tenth Circuit is therefore indicating that there are a subset of plaintiffs who are not entitled to the relief afforded in Pulliam, and that subset is discussed in more detail within footnote 6. Nowhere does the Tenth Circuit state that all plaintiffs are prohibited from seeking the relief permitted in Pulliam. Further, the discussion included in footnote 6 clearly indicates that this subset of plaintiffs is comprised of those suing under § 1983. Id. n. 6 (discussing FCIA’s amendment to § 1983). The footnote’s case citations follow suit, as all concern instances where the plaintiff’s claim was tied to § 1983. Id. (citing Roth v. King, 449 F.3d 1272, 1286 (D.C.Cir.2006) (holding judges of Superior Court of District of Columbia were immune from § 1983 suit for injunctive relief) (noting “42 U.S.C. § 1983, as amended in 1996 by the [FCIA], explicitly immunizes judicial officers against suits for injunctive relief“) and Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1242 (11th Cir.2000) (finding district court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ Bivens action against defendant judges pursuant to FCIA amendment to § 1983) (noting that § 1983 law is incorporated into Bivens actions)).

Declaratory relief against Judges

Thursday, April 1st, 2010

The Defendants also argued that the district court erred when it denied them qualified immunity. As the Defendants have conceded, qualified immunity is only an immunity from a suit for damages, and does not provide immunity from suit for declaratory or injunctive relief. See L.A. Police Protective League v. Gates, 995 F.2d 1469, 1472 (9th Cir.1993). The Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity to the extent that the Plaintiffs seek monetary damages.

In analyzing the Defendants’ qualified immunity defense, we must determine: (1) what right has been violated; (2) whether that right was so “clearly established” at the time of the incident that a reasonable official would have been aware that the conduct violated constitutional bounds; and (3) whether a reasonable public official could have believed that the alleged conduct 989 was lawful. See Newell v. Sauser, 79 F.3d 115, 117 (9th Cir.1996).

To withstand the Defendants’ claims of qualified immunity, the Plaintiffs must allege a violation of a right that was clearly established in 1998 — the time the alleged constitutional violations first occurred. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639-40, 107 S.Ct. 3034; Sorrels v. McKee, 290 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir.2002). To defeat qualified immunity, “the right allegedly violated must be defined at the appropriate level of specificity before a court can determine if it was clearly established.” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999).

But, the Plaintiffs need not establish that the Defendants’ “behavior had been previously declared unconstitutional.” Blueford v. Prunty, 108 F.3d 251, 254 (9th Cir.1997). Rather, if binding authority indicates that “the disputed right existed, even if no case had specifically so declared,” the Defendants would be on notice of the right. Id. at 255. If the occasion has not risen for our circuit to reach a question, we may draw clearly established law from other circuits. See Prison Legal News v. Lehman, 397 F.3d 692, 701 (9th Cir.2005); Jacobs v. City of Chicago, 215 F.3d 758, 767 (7th Cir.2000) (finding a violation of clearly established law where there is “such a clear trend in the case law” that recognition of the right is “only a matter of time”).

DUI Blogs that are Networked

Saturday, March 13th, 2010

DR. DUI Trademark. California’s premier DUI Attorney

Saturday, March 13th, 2010

 

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Here goes number 5

Thursday, March 11th, 2010

I am in the 5th trial of the year so far (that was fast). This one is in Lancaster.

Kind Regards,

Okorie Okorocha, Attorney (Practice Limited to Defending those accused of DUI, regardless of alleged Blood Alcohol Concentration)
“We, as criminal defense lawyers, are forced to deal with some of the lowest people on earth, people who have no sense of right and wrong, people who will lie in court to get what they want, people who do not care who gets hurt in the process. It is our job–our sworn duty–as criminal defense lawyers, to protect our clients from those people.”
—Cynthia Roseberry
Pasadena – Newport Beach – Santa Barbara – San Diego
toll free: 800 285 1763
toll free Fax: 888 286 1840

San Diego DUI Lawyers — http://www.hslblaw.com

Santa Barbara DUI Attorneys – http://www.bhglaw.com

Newport Beach Attorneys –  http://www.cprslaw.com/

 Newport Beach DUI Specialists — http://www.calegalteam.com

Dr. DUI on the Junk Science of Breathalyzers

Wednesday, March 3rd, 2010

Here is what you need to know about breathalyzers:

Okorie “Dr. DUI” Okorocha, Attorney  (Practice Limited to Defending those accused of DUI, regardless of alleged Blood Alcohol Concentration)
Nationally Board Certified Criminal Trial Lawyer
*By the only National Board recognized by the State Bar of California
Named to SuperLawyers 2010
Named Top DUI Lawyer for 2009
toll free: 800 285 1763
toll free Fax: 888 286 1840

“[Mr. Okorocha] is more specialized than any other lawyer that we have ever have in court”  –20 Year DUI Prosecutor on the skills of Mr. Okorocha–

“We, as criminal defense lawyers, are forced to deal with some of the lowest people on earth, people who have no sense of right and wrong, people who will lie in court to get what they want, people who do not care who gets hurt in the process. It is our job–our sworn duty–as criminal defense lawyers, to protect our clients from those people.”
—Cynthia Roseberry